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Abstract
The philosophy of perception has been mostly focused on vision, to 
the detriment of other modalities like audition or olfaction. In this 
paper I focus on olfaction and olfactory experience, and raise the fol-
lowing questions: is olfaction a perceptual-representational modality? 
If so, what does it represent? My goal in the paper is, firstly, to provide 
an affirmative answer to the first question, and secondly, to argue that 
olfaction represents odors in the form of olfactory objects, to which 
olfactory qualities are attributed. In order to do this I develop an em-
pirically adequate notion of olfactory object that is sensitive to the pe-
culiarities of olfaction, and defend it against various objections.
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1 Introduction
We hold our olfactory experiences in great esteem. We spend a 
considerable amount of time and money perfuming our clothes, our 
homes, and ourselves. We find great pleasure in the kind of olfactory 
experiences we have when we hold a glass of fine wine against our 
noses, or feel the aroma of freshly brewed coffee in the morning. A 
certain smell can bring powerful memories from the past and create 
long-lasting emotional associations, while an unpleasant smell can 
make us feel immediately uneasy, with an overwhelming urge to get 
away from the malodorous source of the smell.
And yet, in spite of the great importance assigned to olfactory 
experience in everyday life, many questions in the philosophy of 
olfaction remain unanswered. In particular, is olfaction a percep-
tual-representational modality? Or should we understand olfactory 
experiences in the model of sensations, i.e., as non-perceptual, non-
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representational sensory states with no intentional objects of their 
own? Moreover, if olfaction is a perceptual-representational modal-
ity, what does it represent? Does it represent odors in the form of 
olfactory objects, to which qualities like ‘musky’, ‘rosy’ or ‘minty’ 
are attributed? Or does olfaction merely represent the instantiation 
of free-floating olfactory qualities like ‘rosy’ or ‘fruity’, that are not 
attributed to any odor in particular?1
These questions remain hotly debated topics in the philosophy 
of olfaction. Regarding the first, many philosophers remain uncon-
vinced that olfaction is a perceptual-representational modality, to be 
treated in the same model as vision (Peacocke 1983, Perkins 1983, 
Chalmers 1996). According to a popular argument in favor of this 
view, the phenomenology of olfaction calls for a theoretical treat-
ment in the model of sensations, rather than perceptions directed at 
something external to the subject.
Moreover, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that ol-
faction is a perceptual-representational modality, it is still not clear 
what it would mean for it to represent odors as olfactory objects. 
One popular argument against this view is based on the observation 
that we cannot, on the basis of olfaction, spatially discriminate odors 
from one another (Matthen 2005, Clark 2000, Batty 2010). Odors 
do not have definite sizes, and do not occupy determinate locations in 
the space around us. But as many philosophers have argued, genuine 
object representation presupposes a capacity for spatial differentia-
tion and tracking (Shoemaker 1996, Campbell 2007, Siegel 2006a). 
Therefore, the poor spatial character of olfaction suggests that odors 
are not represented in olfaction in the form of olfactory objects. If 
1  These two views are not meant to exhaust all possible options. Another 
possibility would be to hold that olfaction represents sources of odors, objects 
that typically give off smells such as roses, basil leaves or wet dogs. There are, 
however, notorious difficulties with this view. For once, it would make all our 
experiences of rosy smells that are not caused by the presence of roses falsidical, 
but this seems wrong. When we smell a bottle of rose oil, there is nothing wrong 
with our noses, and we are not under any kind of olfactory illusion: we accurately 
smell a rosy odor in the air, as we should. As no one, as far as I know, has seriously 
defended the view that olfaction represents sources of odors, I will not consider it 
in this paper (see Lycan 1996, Batty 2010, Perkins 1983 and Richardson 2013 for 
further arguments against this view).
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olfaction has a representational content at all, this content must have 
an objectless structure (Batty 2010). This argument remains one of 
the biggest challenges to the claim that olfaction represents odors as 
olfactory objects.
In this paper I will provide an answer to this argument, and eluci-
date the sense in which odors are represented in olfaction as olfacto-
ry objects. First of all, the criteria for object representation sketched 
above presuppose a highly visuocentric notion of ‘objecthood’, based 
on the kinds of solid, opaque, three-dimensional material objects we 
encounter in visual experience. But that is hardly relevant for a sense 
modality like olfaction. If olfaction represents olfactory objects, it is 
surely not because these objects are presented to us in experience as 
spatially discriminated entities. Rather, I’ll suggest that the relevant 
criterion for individuating olfactory objects is chemical structure. Our 
olfactory system is naturally tuned to recovering certain chemical 
structures amidst all the chemical compounds that arrive simultane-
ously at the nose, thus representing each of these recovered struc-
tures as an odor, which is an olfactory object. Moreover, I shall argue 
that there are two good reasons to postulate olfactory objects:
First of all, the object-attribute structure of olfactory contents 
capture very well certain experiences of smelling, where we focus 
on a certain smell and come to notice some of its subtler tones. Ob-
jectless contents, as I will argue, do not adequately capture these 
experiences. Secondly, olfactory objects serve to mark an important 
psychological ability attributed to the olfactory system, whereby it 
is able to discount idiosyncratic variations in chemical stimulation 
in order to focus on the more stable chemical properties of the dis-
tal odor itself, which is represented as an olfactory object that stays 
constant even as proximal stimulation changes. This makes the no-
tion of olfactory object very useful in theorizing about olfaction and 
olfactory experience.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I will start by introduc-
ing a view I will call subjectivism, which argues, on the basis of 
phenomenological observations, that olfaction is not a perceptual-
representational modality (Chalmers 1996, Perkins 1983). I will 
then borrow an argument from Louise Richardson (2013) in order 
to show that phenomenological considerations alone do not support 
a subjectivist conclusion. As an alternative, in section 3 I will discuss 
representationalist views, according to which olfactory states are 
genuinely perceptual, representational states with semantic prop-
erties of their own. Representationalism can come in two forms: 
object-based views (Lycan 1996/2000, Tye 2002), which postulate 
odors in the form of olfactory objects in the contents of olfaction, 
and objectless views (Batty 2010), which take the contents of olfac-
tory states to have an existentially quantified, objectless structure.
My final conclusion will be that object-based representationalism 
is true of olfaction, although the arguments adduced in its favor by 
Lycan and Tye will be shown to be less than satisfactory. But before 
defending this view I will consider in section 4 one powerful objec-
tion against it, raised by Tyler Burge (2010): according to Burge, 
there is no explanatory gain in positing perceptual representations 
of odors. We should only posit perceptual representations if there is 
need to distinguish what is proximally registered by the organism’s 
sensory systems from what is supposedly represented in the organ-
ism’s perceptual state. But since we have no need to draw this dis-
tinction in olfaction, we should not take olfaction to be a perceptual-
representational modality.
But this objection can be met. In the last and final section of the 
paper, I will appeal to empirical data in order to argue that we do need 
to posit perceptual representations of odors in olfaction. Most odors 
we experience are complex mixtures of many different odorants, 
and are usually delivered to our noses along many other odorants and 
compounds. In order for us to have an experience as of a particular 
odor, the olfactory system needs to extract a very complex blend 
against a background of irrelevant odorants, and represent it as the 
same odor despite idiosyncratic variations in chemical stimulation. 
Thus, contrary to what Burge supposes, we do need to distinguish 
proximal registration of odorants from perceptual representations of 
odors. We do need, after all, olfactory objects: an odor representa-
tion that stays constant even as proximal stimulation changes.
2 Subjectivism
Many philosophers have argued that it would be wrong to take olfac-
tion as a perceptual-representational modality. According to what 
we may call subjectivism, the most accurate way to characterize 
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olfactory states would be in terms of unstructured sensations of odor 
qualities like ‘musky’, ‘rosy’ or ‘minty’, that may call up memories 
or cause certain emotional states, but that do not represent anything. 
Olfactory experience in this view does not attribute qualities to any-
thing other than itself. These qualities are properties of experience, 
something internal to the subject (hence the term ‘subjectivism’).
The main argument in favor of subjectivism is phenomenological. 
According to the subjectivist, olfactory experience does not reveal 
that the qualities we smell are qualities of something external to us. 
Rather, we experience these qualities as qualitative modifications of 
our own consciousness, something that happens within us. Take, for 
example, an experience of a rosy smell; if we abstract away from our 
visual and/or tactile experience of a rose, and from our background 
knowledge that this kind of olfactory quality is typically caused by 
the presence of roses, the smell itself does not seem to be a stable 
property of an external object that would continue to exist unper-
ceived. As Chalmers puts it, ‘smell has little in the way of apparent 
structure and often floats free of any apparent object, remaining a 
primitive presence in our sensory manifold’ (Chalmers 1996: 8).2
Moreland Perkins agrees (1983). On the basis of similar phenom-
enological observations, Perkins argues that what we become aware 
of in olfaction is not a sensible quality of an external object like an 
odor or its source. Rather, we become aware of a qualitative feature 
of our own experience, of its distinctive phenomenal character. ‘It 
smells rosy’, in this picture, should be glossed as: ‘my experience has a 
rosy-like olfactory character’. Therefore, Perkins concludes that it would 
be wrong to adopt a realist perspective vis-à-vis olfactory qualities: 
they aren’t properties of things in the world, they are dispositions 
in us to have experiences of certain distinctive kinds (Perkins 1983, 
ch. 3).
It is hard to deny that subjectivism has some initial appeal. Histor-
ically, olfaction has always been considered to be a more subjective 
sense modality, more naturally associated with unmediated affective 
2 Peacocke (1983) also suggests something along similar lines, when he 
writes: ‘a sensation of smell, by contrast [with visual perception], may have no 
representational content of any sort, though of course the sensation will be of a 
distinctive kind’ (Peacocke 1983: 5).
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responses and memory associations than with perceptual knowledge 
about the external world, as vision has always been.3 This affective 
and mnemonic dimension suggests a picture of olfaction as a sort 
of ‘inner’ window onto the self, a direct link to our most primitive 
and unmediated affective responses, rather than a form of epistemic 
‘openness’ to the external world.
This view seems to be supported by empirical evidence. Studies 
with anosmic patients, i.e., people who have completely lost their 
sense of smell, reveals how crucial olfaction is in making us feel ‘at 
home’ in the world, providing an affective background against which 
conscious experience takes place (Van Toller 2000). After losing 
their sense of smell these patients feel lost, unmotivated, and eventu-
ally exhibit signs of severe depression. It is as if their experiences had 
no ‘color’ anymore, as if they could no longer fully connect to the 
world they inhabited. These observations suggest a more subjectivist 
picture of olfaction: one where olfactory states function as an af-
fective background against which conscious experience takes place, 
rather than representing something external to the mind. Olfaction 
looks inwards, so to speak, not outwards.
But of course, there is nothing here a representationalist needs 
to disagree with. No one denies that there is an important affective, 
subjective dimension to olfaction, but that need not be incompat-
ible with the claim that olfaction is a genuine perceptual-represen-
tational modality, whose function is not only to tell us of our own 
internal states but also to inform us about the current state of the 
world around us. Furthermore, it is far from clear that this subjec-
tivist, ‘inner-looking’ picture of olfaction is something we can get 
out of phenomenological reflection alone. When the subjectivist 
claims that a smell is nothing but a ‘primitive presence in our sen-
sory manifold’, she is in fact ignoring an important dimension of 
olfactory experience. As Louise Richardson (2013) correctly points 
out, our conscious olfactory experiences are typically accompanied 
by an experience of sniffing, a feeling of ‘taking in’ the air from the 
outside as we breathe. As Richardson argues, when we say we have 
an experience of smelling freshly brewed coffee, this is more than an 
3 See Le Guérer 2002 for a historical overview of olfaction in philosophy, 
psychology and psychoanalysis that provides support for this claim.
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introspective report of a qualitative change in us. This is also a report 
on what things are like in our external environment, that something 
‘out there’ bears this olfactory quality. For we only sense the smell of 
coffee when we actively bring in the air from our external environ-
ment by sniffing. The coffee-like quality that characterizes our ex-
perience is a quality of something that was lurking in the air around 
us, and is now coming into our bodies through our noses. If this is 
an experience we want to avoid, all we need to do is temporarily cut 
the airflow in our noses by holding our breath, thus preventing the 
air from coming in.
There is, in other words, an important exteroceptive element in the 
phenomenal character of conscious olfactory experience, provided 
by the experience of sniffing, of ‘taking in’ the air from outside. 
The subjectivist can only make her case by ignoring this element 
of conscious olfactory experience. But once we see that we cannot 
abstract the experience of sniffing from a complete characterization 
of (typically) what it’s like to smell, the phenomenological case for 
subjectivism is considerably weakened.
Granted, there are some answers available to the subjectivist to 
resist Richardson’s arguments. She could, for example, hold that the 
experience of sniffing is not strictly speaking an element of olfactory 
experience, but a tactile sensation, caused by airflow in the nasal cav-
ities. Although one could hold such a view, I agree with Richardson 
that it would involve some substantial commitments concerning the 
individuation of sensory modalities, which are highly controversial 
(2013: 412-14). So if the subjectivist can make her case only on the 
basis of these controversial commitments, her case is also weakened.
But regardless of our final verdict on the issue, my aim in this sec-
tion was merely to cast some doubt on the sort of phenomenological ob-
servations the subjectivist appeals to in order to make her case. As far as 
phenomenology is concerned, there are other data we may appeal to in 
order to mount a case against subjectivism, as Richardson has shown us. 
Therefore, it is far from clear that this question will be settled on phe-
nomenological grounds alone. But as we shall soon see, there are other 
good, independent reasons for representationalism, which concerns the 
role of olfactory representations in accounting for certain facts about 
olfactory experience and olfactory processing. These will be spelled 
out in more detail in sections 3 and 5 of the paper respectively.
51Olfactory Objects
3 Representationalism
While the arguments in favor of subjectivism remain controversial, 
the most plausible theoretical alternative is representationalism. 
According to the representationalist, olfactory states are genuinely 
perceptual, representational states with semantic properties of their 
own, which function to tell us something about our external envi-
ronment. Olfactory experience, in this picture, does not merely tell 
us that qualities are instantiated; it tells us that these qualities are 
instantiated out there, in the world, an experience that may be true 
or false, accurate or inaccurate according to how things really are 
out there.
But if we move towards representationalism, one question that 
immediately arises concerns what it is exactly that olfaction repre-
sents. According to object-based representationalism, olfaction 
represents odors in the form of olfactory objects, which bear the 
olfactory qualities we experience. One supporter of an object-based 
view is Michael Tye (2002). Although Tye’s primary concerns are 
not with a philosophical theory of olfaction, he does provide some 
brief remarks in that direction, which suggests a phenomenological 
argument in favor of object-based representationalism. ‘When we 
introspect our experiences of hearing, smelling, and tasting,’ Tye 
tells us, ‘the qualities of which we are directly aware are qualities we 
experience as being qualities of sounds, odors, and tastes’ (Tye 2002: 
142). Although he does not develop this point in more detail, we can 
propose an argument in favor of object-based representationalism 
roughly along these lines:
When we have a certain olfactory experience of a coffee-like 
quality, we feel this quality to be instantiated by something in our 
external environment, as we actively bring in the air from outside 
into our bodies by sniffing. But the things out there that carry the 
chemicals responsible for the olfactory qualities we smell are odors. 
Therefore, if experience represents olfactory qualities in ‘the air out-
side us’, it represents them as qualities of particular odors. This also 
seems to be Lycan’s argument in favor of object-based representa-
tionalism, when he writes:
Consider what an odor is, in the public sense of the term. It is a vapor-
ous emanation, a diffusing collection of molecules typically given off 
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from a definite physical source. It is itself a determinate physical thing 
that makes physical contact with the smell receptors in one’s olfactory 
epithelium and sets them to firing. Moreover, there is nothing arcane 
about this. We are publicly and commonsensically aware of odors; they 
are public physical entities available for sensing by anyone who, fortu-
nately or unfortunately, happens by. (…) Now odor is a candidate for 
the representatum (…) perhaps, then, smells represent odors (Lycan 
1996: 146).
Now, as a metaphysical characterization of odors, the passage above 
is acceptable. However, it can hardly count as an argument for ob-
ject-based representationalism. To be sure, no one would deny that 
odors are in fact the things we come in contact with in olfaction, as 
vaporous emanations that bring to our noses the volatile chemicals 
responsible for the smells we experience. But it does not follow from 
this claim that olfaction represents odors as bearers of the olfactory 
qualities we smell. It is one thing to say, with Richardson (2013), 
that olfactory qualities are presented as instantiated by something 
in the air outside us, and quite another to say they are presented as 
attributes of particular odors. The latter is a more substantial claim, 
which needs to be argued for. But Tye’s and Lycan’s observations do 
not seem to take us far enough.
Philosophers like Austen Clark (2000), Mohan Matthen (2005) 
and Clare Batty (2010), for example, have argued that if odors were 
presented in olfaction as olfactory objects, they should be presented 
as individual entities spatially differentiated from one another; and 
that we should be able, on the basis of olfactory experience, to pick 
out and perceptually track one of these objects as opposed to an-
other. As Shoemaker puts it,
Sense perception affords ‘identification information’ about the object 
of perception. When one perceives one is able to pick out one object 
from others, distinguishing it from the others by information provided 
by the perception, about both its relational and its nonrelational prop-
erties. The provision of such information is involved in the ‘tracking’ 
of the object over time, and its reidentification from one time to an-
other. (Shoemaker 1996: 253)
But olfactory properties are not presented to us like that. If I smell 
something smoky, and then come to smell something minty, olfac-
tory experience does not tell me if there is a single odor that is both 
smoky and minty (as the odor of a mint-flavored cigar that has been 
lit in the room), or if there is one smoky odor and one minty odor (as 
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the odor of a mint-scented air freshener which has been sprayed in 
the room after a cigar has been lit) (Clark 2000: 79). For where would 
the minty odor be, as opposed to the smoky one? And how can I per-
ceptually track one odor rather than the other? These questions are 
meaningless in olfactory experience. All I get from experience are 
free-floating olfactory qualities: ‘minty’, ‘smoky’, and so on (Mat-
then 2005: 284). Differently from vision and even audition, olfaction 
has a very poor spatial character, and it does not seem to provide us 
with ‘identification information’ about odors, as Shoemaker would 
put it. Therefore, according to this line of thought, objectless con-
tents seem unavoidable if we want to be true to the phenomenal 
character of olfaction.
In this spirit Batty proposes her ‘abstract content view’ (or ‘ob-
jectless’ view), where the content of olfactory states are expressed 
with an existentially quantified structure that tells us that olfactory 
qualities are instantiated at some undifferentiated spatial location 
all around the subject (Batty 2010). This structure seeks to capture 
the phenomenological observation that olfactory qualities are always 
presented together in the air around us, and not as properties of one 
particular odor or another. In this picture, an experience of minty 
and smoky olfactory qualities would have a representational content 
like:
OLF EXP: x (x is minty & x is smoky & x is at L0)
4
This general structure, with only one quantifier and one undifferen-
tiated location ‘all around the subject’ (L0), is supposed to capture 
all the richness of experience through the possibility of adding as 
many represented qualities as we like inside the parenthesis. At the 
same time, the phenomenological observation that these qualities are 
experienced as spatially undifferentiated is respected by keeping L0 
as the only location referred to in the content of this experience, 
comprising the entirety of the olfactory field. This experience will 
be veridical if there is really something out there that smells minty 
and smoky, and false otherwise — in case the subject is victim of the 
kind of olfactory hallucination seen in clinical cases of phantosmia, 
where patients have recurrent olfactory experiences in the absence 
4 From Batty 2010: 530.
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of external stimulation (Cowart & Rawson 2005).
But is it true that these contents can really capture ‘all the rich-
ness of experience’? It doesn’t seem so. To see why, imagine for ex-
ample that you are quietly working in your office, when a delicious 
smell comes into the room. You sniff profoundly, and come to rec-
ognize it as grilled eggplant. According to Batty, the content of your 
experience would be captured by a structure like:
OLF EXP 1: x (x is eggplanty & x is at L0)
But suppose that for some reason you become interested in this smell. 
You want to know more about it. You focus your attention on it, and 
start to notice some of its subtler notes and tones. There is a sweet 
tone to it, and perhaps also something earthy. You have adopted a 
different perspective in relation to the smell, where you consciously 
try to sense its subtler qualities and tones.5 But how can we capture 
this experience in Batty’s view? With the theoretical tools at our dis-
posal, the only option would be to add these further qualities to ‘the 
air around us’, leaving us with a content like:
OLF EXP: x (x is eggplanty & x is sweet & x is earthy & x is at L0)
But this does not seem right. As formulated, this content fails to cap-
ture the sense in which the sweet and earthy qualities you smell are 
qualities of the eggplant odor, which you notice when you focus your 
attention on the smell in this manner. They are not just qualities in 
the air, presented to you alongside the eggplant quality; rather, they 
are subtler tones of the eggplant smell.
To make this point clearer, imagine that as you are noticing the 
subtler tones of the eggplant smell you notice another smell in the 
air, which you recognize as sweet potato pie being baked in the oven. 
According to Batty the contents of your experience would be some-
thing like:
OLF EXP: x (x is eggplanty & x is sweet & x is earthy & x is 
sweet-potato-y & x is at L0)
5 This change of perspective is something very familiar to wine tasters and 
perfumers, who need to break a smell apart and notice some subtler tones that 
inexperienced smellers have more trouble noticing (Lawless 1997).
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But now imagine that you focus your attention on the smell of sweet 
potato pie, and come to notice some of its subtler qualities, which are 
also presented to you as sweet and earthy tones. If we follow Batty 
the contents of this experience would be exactly the same as the 
content of the previous experience, when you focused on the quali-
ties and subtler tones of the eggplant smell. But these are different 
experiences, with different phenomenal characters. Focusing on an 
eggplant smell and noticing its sweet and earthy tones, while there is 
also a smell of sweet potato pie in the room is different from focus-
ing on the smell of sweet potato pie and noticing its sweet and earthy 
tones, while there is also a smell of grilled eggplant in the room. 
Batty’s theoretical apparatus seems unable to distinguish between 
these two experiences.
In order to acknowledge the difference between these two cases 
we need something else in addition to existentially quantified prop-
erties and reference to an undifferentiated location L0. What we need 
is an odor, an olfactory object, that could bear the different qualities 
one comes to notice when one focus one’s attention on it. Once we 
allow olfactory objects in the contents of olfactory experience, the 
experience of focusing on the eggplant smell and noticing its sweet 
and earthy tones could be captured in terms of a structure like:
OLF EXP: ([grilled eggplant] sweet, earthy)
The linguistic material inside the brackets stands for a repeatable type, 
that marks a psychological ability attributed to the olfactory system: 
to recover from all the chemical compounds that arrive at the nose, 
the familiar chemical structure of the odor recognized as a ‘grilled 
eggplant’ odor. This is so regardless of the linguistic material we 
choose to put between the brackets. As Howes 2002 has shown, the 
linguistic labels people attach to odors are highly idiosyncratic, so how 
we choose to express this content in linguistic form is not important. 
The olfactory object between brackets is posited in order to mark an 
ability of the olfactory system, to segregate a certain chemical struc-
ture from a background of chemical noise. In the example above the 
olfactory object was classified as a ‘grilled eggplant’ odor, but it could 
easily have a different linguistic label (‘grandma’s summer eggplant’), 
or no label at all (you recognize it as an odor you have experienced 
before, but you are incapable of applying a linguistic label to it).
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When your olfactory system represents this odor, you are in a 
position to focus your attention on it, and notice some of its subtler 
tones. This odor may also bring up childhood memories of summer 
barbecues by the lake, which give you a feeling of peace and relax-
ation. If you then come to notice a smell of sweet potato pie along-
side the eggplant smell, according to the picture I am suggesting we 
would now have a different olfactory object, which we could incor-
porate into the content of your experience in the following manner:
OLF EXP: ([grilled eggplant] sweet, earthy & [sweet potato pie])
If you now focus on the smell of sweet potato pie and notice its sweet 
and earthy subtler tones, the contents of your experience would be 
something like:
OLF EXP: ([grilled eggplant] & [sweet potato pie] sweet, earthy)
The difference between the two experiences can now be easily cap-
tured, in terms of a difference in the olfactory object to which these 
subtler qualities are attributed in experience: ‘grilled eggplant’ in 
one case, ‘sweet potato pie’ in the other. This move is not available if 
we adopt Batty’s theoretical apparatus, where all qualities are pred-
icated of the same undifferentiated space ‘all around the subject’. 
These kinds of experiences motivate a view of olfactory contents 
structured in object-attribute form. When we focus on a smell in 
order to find out about its subtler qualities, we are not simply focus-
ing on ‘the air all around us’; we are focusing on one odor among 
other in the room, which is represented in experience as an olfactory 
object.
There is, however, an obvious problem with this proposal: 
haven’t we seen before that the phenomenal character of olfaction 
speaks against odors being represented as olfactory objects, since we 
cannot not spatially distinguish one odor from another? Indeed we 
have, but this phenomenological observation simply begs the ques-
tion against a modality with poor spatial character like olfaction. 
This argument presupposes a notion of ‘objecthood’ that is highly 
visuocentric, based on the kinds of solid, opaque material objects we 
encounter in visual experience, with edges and boundaries delimit-
ing a specific spatial position or a traceable spatial trajectory. But it 
is clear that if odors are supposed to be represented in olfaction as 
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olfactory objects, it will not be because they are presented in experi-
ence as spatially discriminated entities.
Rather, what is relevant in the case of olfaction is chemical struc-
ture. Odors, in this picture, are type-individuated by their chemical 
structure, and it is the function of the olfactory system to recover 
these structures out of all the chemical compounds that arrive si-
multaneously at the nose. The output of this process is a (token) rep-
resentation of an odor — an olfactory object — that characterizes 
the content of your olfactory experience. It is this odor what you 
recognize as an odor you have experienced before, and that you may 
come to recognize again in the future. For even if you encounter this 
odor again under very different conditions of chemical stimulation, 
i.e., mixed with other chemical compounds, as long as your olfac-
tory system is functioning correctly it should normally be able to 
recover that same chemical structure and represent it as the same 
odor, which you may experience as a grilled eggplant odor again. That 
the odor is not presented to you as occupying a certain spatial loca-
tion has no bearing on its status as an olfactory object.
There is, however, a more serious objection that can be raised 
against this view. As Tyler Burge has argued at length (2010), we 
should only posit perceptual representations if they have a non-trivial ex-
planatory role to play in accounting for the organism’s sensory state. 
If there is no need to distinguish information that is proximally regis-
tered in the organism’s sensory systems from what is supposedly rep-
resented in the organism’s perceptual state, talk of perceptual rep-
resentations is explanatorily idle. In this case, we can fully account 
for the organism’ sensory state in terms of low-level mechanisms of 
sensory registration. Let’s call this Burge’s constraint on genuine 
perceptual representations.6
Now, if the view sketched above is correct and olfaction indeed 
represents odors as olfactory objects, then we should naturally ex-
pect our analysis of odor representation to conform to Burge’s con-
straint. But it is far from clear that it does. As we shall see in the next 
section, it seems that all we need to mention in order to account 
6 This constraint can also be found (although in slightly different formula-
tions) in both Smith (2002) and Siegel (2006b). But since I will focus on Burge’s 
version of it I will call it ‘Burge’s constraint’.
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for the content of olfactory states are mechanisms of odorant detec-
tion at the olfactory bulb, which directly cause the organism to have 
a distinctive experience that corresponds to the odorant detected. 
Nothing is gained by saying these odors are perceptually represented by 
the olfactory system.
But this objection can be met. After explaining and motivating 
Burge’s constraint in section 4 of the paper, in section 5 I will appeal 
to recent empirical studies that provide evidence for olfactory con-
stancies, where the olfactory system is able to discount idiosyncratic 
variations in proximal stimulation in order to focus on the more sta-
ble chemical properties that characterize the represented odor. This 
suggests that odor representations do meet Burge’s constraint after 
all, and that olfaction is a perceptual-representational modality.
4 Burge’s Constraint
Let’s start by examining the case of the salmon discussed by Burge 
(2010). It is known that at about four years of age, the salmon re-
turns to the stream where it originally molted, sometimes following 
an olfactory trail through the ocean over thousands and thousands 
of miles. It does so by detecting certain odor plumes in the water 
at certain intensities, which causes it to respond in a certain way: 
it orients itself in the direction of the sensed smell, and holds its 
course until the intensity starts dropping. At this point, it will start 
to zigzag again until the level of intensity detected rises, and so on. 
Should we take the salmon to perceptually represent these odor plumes? 
Here’s Burge:
As the salmon case illustrates, the tasks solved by the homing capacity 
can be immensely complex. Yet such systems of sensory registration 
are not perceptual. The sensory contribution to behavior is fully ex-
plained by appeal to registration of proximal stimulation on the ani-
mal’s surface. There are no operations for forming representation as 
of a specific environmental source of information. No spatial relation-
ships are represented. Only the type of intensity of the proximal stim-
ulus are sensed. Spatial location is determined by repeated sampling 
techniques. For the salmon, the direction and ultimately the location 
of the original molting site are ascertained by following up serially on 
the intensity of relevant proximal stimulation on one or another side of 
the animal’s body (Burge 2010: 425-6).
In this passage Burge is pointing to a general constraint governing 
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the theoretical notion of ‘perceptual representation’: we should ap-
peal to perceptual representations in psychological explanations only 
if we need them in order to distinguish what is perceptually repre-
sented from proximal stimulation registered in the organism’s sen-
sory system. More precisely, an organism is credited with perceptual 
representations of X only if, by discounting proximal features that 
are merely perspectival, its perceptual system is able to focus on the 
more stable properties of the distal X, so that the organism might 
take on different perspectives on X and still represent it as X. In other 
words, only if O’s perceptual system is capable of applying percep-
tual constancies to proximal stimuli, maintaining the representation 
of X constant despite shifts in perceptual perspectives. This condi-
tion on genuine perceptual representations is what I call Burge’s 
constraint.
To make this point clearer let’s take the case of human vision, 
which is an excellent candidate for a genuine perceptual system. In 
order to explain how we visually perceive a uniformly colored red 
cube, it’s not enough to mention the patterns and spectral properties 
of light registered in the retina, since the mere registration of these 
features underdetermines the color we actually perceive. In fact, in 
order to explain how we perceive a particular red cube as such, we 
need to mention transformational principles that take the initial pat-
terns of light and dark registered in the retina and generate a percep-
tual representation of a three-dimensional, uniformly colored red 
cube, that is perceived as the same throughout a period of perceptual 
tracking, from different perspectives and under different conditions 
of illumination.7
But now let’s consider the case of olfaction. There seems to be 
a kind of ‘directness’ in olfaction that distinguishes it from the way 
other sensory modalities process their stimuli. Indeed, there seems 
to be no space for olfactory representations to intervene, as opposed 
to sensory detection of odorants. In vision, for instance, although 
we perceive external material objects like tables and chairs, all we 
receive is light reflected from these objects, which must be trans-
formed into meaningful perceptual units according to transforma-
tional principles hard-wired into the visual system by evolutionary 
7 See Palmer 1999, Bruce et al. 2003.
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pressures. But what we inhale in olfaction are the actual molecules 
that have evaporated from their sources and found their way through 
the air into our nasal cavity, where they are picked up by our olfac-
tory receptors and bound to specific kinds of proteins, determined 
by the chemical properties and three-dimensional configuration of 
these molecules. This docking process, as it is usually called in the 
cognitive psychology of olfaction, excites the nerve cells, causing 
electric signals to be sent to the olfactory bulb in a specific spatial 
pattern; these patterns correspond to the specific odors we are able 
to detect, giving rise to the correspondent olfactory experience 
(Cowart & Rawson 2005, Savic 2001).
If the picture sketched above is correct, there is not much room 
for ‘olfactory constancies’ to be applied, no sense in which olfac-
tory processing has to discount perspectival proximal stimuli in or-
der to focus on invariant features of the external stimuli. In fact, as 
what is detected by our olfactory receptors is nothing other than the 
external stimulus itself – the actual molecules that have evaporated 
from their source and came in contact with our olfactory receptors – 
the notion of a perspectival proximal stimulus, distinct from its distal 
source, doesn’t make sense here. Even if we consider the subject’s 
movement towards or away the source of the smell as a sort of ‘olfac-
tory perspective’, the only difference in stimulation this perspective 
shift would bring would be a difference in intensity, which is easily 
explained by a lower concentration of molecules in the air; but there 
is no proximal stimulation here to be discounted for the odor to be 
perceived as the same. In this picture, a certain olfactory experience 
arises when the molecules that compose the experienced odor are 
detected by our olfactory receptors, and a signal sent to the olfactory 
bulb. It seems that we are able to explain all there is to explain about 
our olfactory states and experiences with this very simple processing 
model. There is no need to posit representations of olfactory ob-
jects, distinct from what is sensorily registered at the olfactory bulb. 
Odors, therefore, do not appear to meet Burge’s constraint.8
This appearance, as I will argue in the next section, is deceiv-
ing. Empirical evidence shows that the olfactory system does apply 
8 See Burge 2010: 415 for an explicit endorsement of this claim regarding the 
human olfactory system.
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olfactory constancies to stimuli that are proximally registered at the 
olfactory bulb. This will give us a notion of an olfactory object — an 
odor — that meets Burge’s constraint on genuine perceptual repre-
sentation, and that is also adequate to the phenomenology of olfac-
tion.
5 Olfactory Objects
Up until the last decade or so, psychological research on olfaction 
has mostly focused on detection and discrimination of monomo-
lecular artificial odorants, either presented in isolation or in very 
simple mixtures, under carefully controlled laboratory conditions. 
In a typical experiment, for example, a subject would be presented 
with simple chemical compounds like n-butanol or b–phenethyl, and 
psychologists tested for odor detection and discrimination thresh-
old in different concentrations.9 As these odorants had very simple 
chemical compositions and were usually presented in isolation (i.e., 
with little or no background chemical noise), there was no need to 
distinguish what was proximally detected in the olfactory bulb from 
the subject’s conscious olfactory experience. However, many psy-
chologists now think that these experiences fail to capture the rich-
ness and complexity of our everyday olfactory experiences, where 
we need to take a much wider range of factors into account. If we 
want to explain a subject’s olfactory experience in real-world situ-
ations, we cannot limit ourselves to proximal stimulation alone, as 
there will be a wide variety of chemical compounds arriving simul-
taneously at our olfactory receptors. In these situations, psycholo-
gists now argue that we must look beyond the olfactory bulb to how 
olfactory stimuli is represented at the piriform cortex, an area of the 
brain involved in olfactory attention, multisensory integration and 
olfactory consciousness. And there are good reasons to take these 
representations to be genuinely perceptual, distinct from the kind of 
proximal stimulation detected and encoded at the olfactory bulb.10
First of all, real-world situations of olfactory perception seem to 
9 See Stevens et al. 1988 for review.
10 See Stevenson & Wilson 2007, Barnes et al. 2008, Gottfried 2010, and 
references mentioned therein.
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require some sort of figure-ground segregation, a process traced to the 
piriform cortex that seems to be genuinely perceptual in nature (in 
the sense specified in Burge’s constraint). Looking beyond the sim-
ple monomolecular odorants used by psychologists in the laboratory, 
most odors we experience in real-world situations are complex mix-
tures of many different odorants, and are usually delivered to our 
noses along many other odorants and compounds. But even if all this 
chemical noise is simultaneously detected by our olfactory receptors, 
for one of these odors to be experienced as such, as the odor that it is, 
the olfactory system needs to be able to extract a very complex blend 
against a background of irrelevant odorants and competing olfactory 
objects. By successfully masking all irrelevant background noise, this 
process will ultimately yield an odor representation at the piriform 
cortex (Stevenson & Wilson 2007, Gottfried 2010).
Think, for example, of the kinds of olfactory experiences you 
may have while walking through a food market downtown; despite 
being constantly bombarded with several different odors at the same 
time, you are nevertheless able to sometimes focus on the smell of 
ginger beef, other times on basil chicken, or caramelized bananas, 
and so on. When you focus on one of these odors as opposed to 
the others, the odor becomes a figure against a background of masked 
chemical noise. Of course, this does not mean that the odor will be 
experienced as in a spatial location distinct from the one where you 
experience a different odor, but that is beside the point. What is 
segregated by the olfactory system is not the spatial location of the 
vaporous cloud of molecules responsible for the odor in question, but 
its chemical structure: the stable chemical properties that composes the 
odor the system is able to detect and represent, as opposed to others 
that are temporarily masked as part of background chemical noise.
The market experience is not something we can account for with 
proximal stimulation alone; psychologists explain figure-ground 
segregation in olfaction partly in terms of a process of cortical adap-
tation, whereby, after a brief period of exposure to stable odors in 
the environment, neurons at the piriform cortex stop responding 
to these odors, thus facilitating the detection and representation of 
a novel target odor. This odor may be then experienced against a 
background of chemical noise ‘as if that target odor alone were present,’ 
as Stevenson and Wilson argue, ‘despite the fact that, at the nose, a bi-
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nary mixture of the target and background is present (Stevenson & Wilson 
2007: 1824).’ If we want to explain a subject’s experience of ‘basil 
chicken odor’ in the food market, we need to go beyond processes 
of odorant detection, which detect the whole range of odorants and 
compounds that simultaneously reach the nose (at the right levels 
of concentration). Rather, we must bring in this process of cortical 
adaptation, responsible for filtering background chemical noise and 
yielding a cortical representation of a single ‘basil chicken’ odor.
Moreover, the stimuli proximally detected in the olfactory bulb is 
highly inconstant, often showing enormous variations in its chemical 
properties depending on the temperature and humidity of the air, 
force and speed of the wind, nose angle, respiratory phase, and so 
on (Gottfried 2010, Barnes et al. 2008). Due to these variations, it 
may be that on certain occasion some of the odorants that compose 
an odor are not actually registered at the olfactory bulb. But we are 
still able to experience a particular odor in these circumstances as 
such, even if some of its components are missing. And we continue 
to experience it as the same throughout a period of exposure, even 
as its chemical properties change across samplings. Finally, we may 
also come to recognize it as an odor we have previously experienced 
even if it is highly unlikely that odors are ever delivered in the same 
chemical proportion or intensity each time.
This requires the olfactory system to apply olfactory constan-
cies to proximal stimulation, in order to discount changes in chemi-
cal properties that are likely to be caused by idiosyncratic perceptual 
conditions, and focus on the stable chemical structure that charac-
terize the odor itself. As evidence presented in Barnes et al. (2008) 
suggest, operations of pattern completion in the piriform cortex are 
able to ‘fill in’ missing or corrupted compounds, which are likely to 
be the result of poor perceptual conditions. Even if a few odorants 
that compose a certain odor happen to be missing, the olfactory sys-
tem can rely on the simultaneous presence of most of its components 
in order to ‘infer’, as it were, that this odor is likely to be present in 
one’s external environment. This is clearly a perceptual process (in 
the sense of Burge’s constraint), which yields a representation that is 
distinct from proximal stimulation.
This gives us a notion of an olfactory object — an odor — that is 
able to meet Burge’s constraint, and structure the representational 
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content of olfactory states. As I have been arguing in this section, 
the olfactory system’s main function is to perceptually differentiate 
chemical structures from one another (and not to spatially differenti-
ate vaporous clouds of volatile chemicals from one another). In order 
to explain how it can do this, as well as how we can experience a 
certain odor as the same under very different conditions of chemical 
stimulation, we need to posit perceptual representations of odors 
qua olfactory objects. They mark repeatable psychological abilities of 
the olfactory system which can be applied at different times, in order 
to yield a particular (token) representation of the odor in question. 
These odors play various roles in psychological explanations in olfac-
tion: they are what we primarily experience in conscious olfactory 
experience, what serve as the basic units of olfactory attention, what 
is recognized as the same odor upon subsequent perceptual encoun-
ters under different conditions of chemical stimulation, and what 
triggers emotional and mnemonic responses.
These represented odors and their qualities are, as I have been 
arguing, genuine perceptual representations; in order to explain an 
olfactory experience of a certain odor among many other odorants 
that are simultaneously presented to the nose, we need to bring in 
perceptual processes that explain how the olfactory system is able to 
discount idiosyncratic chemical variations in proximal stimulation 
in order to focus on the stable chemical properties that characterize 
the experienced odor. This can be done, as I have suggested, through 
processes of figure-ground segregation and the application of olfac-
tory constancies, which explains how Burge’s constraint can be met 
in olfaction after all.
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